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In 1989 and the early 1990s, state or real socialism (which func-
tioned under many different names, of which ‘crude communism’ is
my favourite) was overthrown in a large part of the Soviet bloc, includ-
ing Poland. At the time, it was not obvious what kind of regime would
replace it, but in the light of the fact that the main agent of change was
the industrial working class, epitomised by the Solidarity trade union
and its leader, Lech Wałęsa, who was himself an industrial worker,
there was an expectation that the new system would reward this class.
However, ten or so years after the anti-communist revolutions, it is
clear that the opposite was the case: working class people and their
communities were the main victims of the shift to the new system –
neoliberal capitalism or simply neoliberalism.[1]  
My understanding of this system, which was introduced, how-
ever unevenly, in the West at the end of the 1970s following the grave
problems of so-called embedded liberalism or Keynesianism, and
which gained a hegemonic position in the 1990s, mirrors that pre-
sented by the Marxist thinker David Harvey in numerous studies,
such as The Condition of Postmodernity (1990), The New Imperialism
(2003), A Brief History of Neoliberalism (2005), The Limits to Capital
(2006) and The Enigma of Capital (2010). Harvey describes neoliber-
alism as a version of capitalism in which capitalists enjoy a high degree
of freedom and protection by the state, while labourers are deprived of
similar freedoms and state protection. The assumption of neoliberal-
ism, in common with the classical liberalism of Adam Smith, is that its
hegemony will lead to the benefit of all: “a rising tide of capitalist
endeavour will «lift all boats».”[2] Yet, neoliberalism does not fulfill
this promise because it boils down to ‘accumulation by dispossession’.
Such accumulation is achieved by: (1) privatisation and commodifica-
tion of public assets; (2) financialisation, in which any kind of good
can be turned into an instrument of economic speculation; (3) the
management and manipulation of crises and (4) state redistribution,
in which the state becomes an agent of the upward redistribution of
wealth, including poor countries subsidising the rich.[3] 
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The third point listed by Harvey, namely embracing crisis and
chaos, rather than equilibrium, accounts for the main difference
between neoliberalism and classical capitalism. As Melinda Cooper
puts it, “What is neo about neoliberalism is its tendency to couple the
idea of the self-organizing economy with the necessity for continual
crisis.”[4] Harvey regards the upward redistribution of wealth and fre-
quent crises as a systemic feature of neoliberalisation, not an unfortu-
nate by-product of the march towards a better world for everybody. As
he succinctly puts it: “An ethical, non-exploitative and socially just
capitalism that redounds to the benefit of all is impossible. It contra-
dicts the very nature of what capital is about.”[5] 
The triumph of neoliberalisation has led to a polarisation of
societies into rich and poor, unknown since the time of the greatest
economic crisis in the 1930s: 
In volume 1 of Capital, Marx shows that the closer a society conforms to
a deregulated, free-market economy, the more asymmetry of power
between those who own and those excluded from ownership of the means
of production will produce an ‘accumulation of wealth of one pole’ and
‘accumulation of misery, agony of toil, slavery, ignorance, brutality, men-
tal degradation, at the opposite pole’ (Capital, vol.1, p. 645).Three decades
of neoliberalization have produced precisely such an unequal outcome. A
plausible argument can be constructed, as I sought to show in A Brief
History of Neoliberalism, that this was what the neoliberalizing agenda of
leading factions of the capitalist class was about from the very outset. Elite
elements of the capitalist class emerged from the turmoil of the 1970s 
having restored, consolidated and in some instances reconstituted the
power worldwide.[6]  
We find a similar diagnosis in studies devoted to postcommunist
Eastern Europe. Their authors argue that the fall of communism
allowed for ‘shock therapy’, namely introducing neoliberal rules with
even greater speed than in the West. David Kideckel, engaging with
the concept of the Eastern European ‘transition’ to the European West,
claims that: 
I shall argue that the region’s problematic is not too slow a movement to
capitalism (as ‘transition’ would have it) but too fast; not too little capital-
ism, but too much. Rather than postsocialist, it is better understood as
‘neo-capitalist’, a social system that reworks basic capitalist principles in
new, even more inegalitarian ways than the Western model from which it
derives.[7] 
In his discussion of the consequences of capitalism for workers and
their families, Karl Marx maintains that that their lives are reduced to
a bare minimum, as in this famous fragment on alienation: 
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As a result [of working under capitalist condition], man (the worker) only
feels himself freely active in his animal functions – eating, drinking, pro-
creating, or at most in his dwelling and in dressing-up, etc.; and in his
human functions he no longer feels himself to be anything but an animal.
What is animal becomes human and what is human becomes animal.[8]
The notion of life reduced to merely physical existence was later elab-
orated by authors such as Walter Benjamin[9], Hannah Arendt[10],
Jacques Rancière[11] and, most importantly from my perspective,
Giorgio Agamben in his book Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare
Life (1998). According to Agamben, the condition of homo sacer is that
of a man who is practically without any rights, who can be killed with
impunity by a sovereign power. Agamben regards modernity, and
especially Nazi Germany, as a hotbed of ‘bare life’, though he does not
elaborate on the connection between the production of ‘bare life’ and
unrestrained capitalism experienced in the West since the late 1970s,
and that existing in the socialist East since the 1990s. However, his
examples of violence, drawn from contemporary colonialism, migra-
tion and eugenics, clearly point to this link.[12] It could be argued that
Keyneysianism and state socialism attempted to transform the ‘bare
life’ of people deprived of almost everything by the Second World War
(which was itself a product of the capitalist crisis of the 1920s and
1930s) and its aftermath, into a ‘good life’, as defined by Aristotle in
Nicomachean Ethics. The production of ‘bare life’ is a consequence of
abandoning this project. The owner of ‘bare life’ under neoliberalism
finds him/herself in an even more precarious position than Marx’s
‘alienated labourer’. This is because thanks to technological develop-
ments the need for work has diminished, leading to increased compe-
tition among those at the receiving end of neoliberal policies. More-
over, the global and invisible character of contemporary capitalism
makes it more difficult to locate the agents of the oppression of the
poor and dispossessed, and hence create strategies to oppose the sta-
tus quo.  
Eastern European films and those made elsewhere, but con-
cerning this part of Europe, have documented and commented on
phenomena such as the institutional violence accompanying and fol-
lowing deindustrialisation, the fierce competition for scarce opportu-
nities for promotion and survival, and the self-exploitation of one’s
body among the poor. Examples include Elvis and Marylin (Elvjs 
e Merilijn, 1998), directed by Armando Manni, Lilya 4-Ever (2002),
directed by Lukas Moodysson, Dirty Pretty Things (2002), directed by
Stephen Frears, Spare Parts (Rezervni deli, 2003), directed by Damjan
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Kozole, Emma’s Secret (Grbavica, 2006), directed by Jasmila Zbanic,
Iska’s Journey (Iszka utazása, 2007), directed by Csaba Bollók and
Ulrich Seidl’s Import/Export (2007). 
Polish films are not an exception to this rule, as the phenome-
na they show are similar to those in the aforementioned films. And yet,
their diagnosis and the solutions they propose to the represented
problems (or the lack thereof) strike me as different. In the subsequent
part of my essay I will examine this Polish specificity, looking at three
examples: Bailiff (Komornik, 2005), directed by Feliks Falk, Edi (2002),
directed by Piotr Trzaskalski, and Silesia, directed by Anna Kazejak-
-Dawid, which is the first part in the omnibus film Ode to Joy (Oda do
radości, 2005), of which the two remaining parts were directed by Jan
Komasa and Maciej Migas. My discussion will foreground the con-
struction of narratives and characters, rather than the aesthetic traits
of these films. Yet, similarities in their style are an important reason
why they come across as belonging to one wave. Visually, all of them
hark back to the ‘gritty realism’ of the Polish Cinema of Moral Concern
of the 1970s, underscoring unattractive aspects of everyday reality by
setting the stories in post-industrial landscapes, limiting the use of
colour, and a preference for less well known actors. One of the direc-
tors of this cluster of films, Feliks Falk, was a leading voice of the
Cinema of Moral Concern.   
Bailiff premiered sixteen years after communism’s collapse in
Poland, when the new political and economic system solidified. The
film attempts to show its consequences, using as its vehicle a character
from a humble background named Lucjan Bohme, who during his
climb up the social ladder exposes various types of malaise in the sur-
rounding reality. Lucjan, however, is not an innocent novice who is
surprised by the injustice and misery he encounters, but a man who
‘sold his soul to the devil’ a long time ago.
Falk previously used a similar character in his two best-known
films, Dance Leader (Wodzirej, 1977) and its sequel, Man of the Year
(Bohater roku, 1986). They featured Lutek (diminutive of Lucjan)
Danielak, who tries to make a career first in the corrupt 1970s and then
in the post-martial law 1980s, which were no less corrupt, only more
chaotic. Falk’s Danielak could be seen as a living incarnation of late
socialism: he takes and pays bribes, acts as a pimp for his girlfriend 
and prostitutes himself. From time to time, he also has pangs of con-
science, but silences them, regarding his misdemeanours as a condi-
tion of survival. Danielak, like the final stage of ‘real socialism’, is 
also very malleable and social. He tries to adjust to different circum-
stances and craves popularity – his very profession as a ‘dance leader’
testifies to this. The people who know him despise him but are able to
live with him. 
Bailiff ’s protagonist, Lucjan, suggests that in Poland history
repeats itself – a sickness pertaining to late communism is poisoning
Bailiff: Everybody 
is guilty
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Polish society under the postcommunist order. Lutek, however, has
matured and has to be treated with respect, which points to an oppo-
site trajectory for history to that offered by Marx: not from tragedy to
farce, but from farce to tragedy, where ‘tragedy’ stands for the capital-
ism which came to Poland in 1989. Bohme’s Germanic surname
reflects the fact that Bailiff is set in Wałbrzych in Lower Silesia, a town
which before the Second World War belonged to Germany, and makes
its bearer appear more menacing. Wałbrzych was prosperous during
the communist period thanks to its rich seams of coal, but after 1989
it declined, as did other coalmining regions in Eastern Europe.[13]  
Lucjan’s profession of bailiff nominally existed in the People’s
Republic of Poland, but there were fewer bailiffs than after 1989 and
their actions were conspicuous due to the ideological dogma that
every citizen in a socialist country has the right to a dignified existence
free from economic worries. In Polish cinema, the figure of the bailiff
was first tackled in the documentary Office (Urząd) by Maria Zmarz-
Koczanowicz, made in 1986, when socialism in Poland was crumbling
and filmmakers were more boldly attacking the myth of working peo-
ple enjoying a decent life in the ‘workers’ state’. During the postcom-
munist period, bailiffs cropped up as secondary characters in many
films. The figure of the bailiff in postcommunist cinema can be seen as
a literalisation of Harvey’s idea of neoliberalism as accumulation by
dispossession, demonstrating that many must lose in order for one to
gain. In Bailiff it appears that the loss and punishment suffered by the
poor is more important than the resulting gains for the wealthy, as
demonstrated by piles of repossessed furniture and household uten-
sils, which had great value for their previous owners but are worthless
garbage for those who expropriated them. 
The deadly character of a bailiff ’s actions are nowhere present-
ed more effectively than in the first scene of Falk’s film, when Lucjan
repossesses life saving machines in a hospital, causing the death of
some patients. Lucjan’s subsequent decisions have comparable gravity.
Determined to prove that the signature of an elderly woman who had
taken a bank credit and then disappeared was falsified, he digs up her
corpse buried in a field belonging to her family. The discovery ruins
the fraudulent family, including a promising footballer, who then
commits suicide. The very fact that the family uses the dead to get
credit can be linked to the idea of self-exploitation, including the
exploitation of the dead, as a means to survive under neoliberalism. Of
course, this points to the fact that neoliberalism reduces many people
to the position of ‘homo sacer’. Lucjan also repossesses the accordion
of a disabled child, which is tantamount to causing the girl’s ‘spiritual
death’. Wherever the bailiff appears, he awakens fear and disgust, 
but nobody can resist his power. On each occasion we see individuals
or small groups of people looking passively at him doing his job or
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protesting without effect. These images can be viewed as a reflection
of the state of the working class after the fall of the Berlin Wall as frag-
mented, powerless and dispirited.[14] 
The difference between the late socialist past and early capital-
ist present is also reflected in the contrast between Lucjan and his
aging mentor, Robert, who is now terminally ill. Robert claims that he
was no angel and always worked to have a good life, but that he also
respected the need of others to survive. As he says, he would never
switch off a life-support machine. Thus, Robert stands for a world
which was far from perfect, but bearable and comprehensible. Lucjan
represents a new world, which is frightening, abstract and impossible
to grasp; which is not even fully understood from within, as demon-
strated by the fact that Lucjan cannot explain what prompts him and
whom he serves, except for his references to the abstract value of
‘keeping his files in order’. The connection of Robert with the old sys-
tem, and Lucjan with the new one is augmented by the film’s casting.
Robert is played by Marian Opania, an actor whose popularity was at
its peak in the 1970s and 1980s. Falk cast in the role of Lucjan the actor
Andrzej Chyra, whose most memorable role prior to Bailiff was that of
a menacing collector of nonexistent debts in Krzysztof Krauze’s Debt
(Dług, 1999), who in the end is killed and dismembered by the men he
was tormenting. While Opania stands for the old world of small peo-
ple, who inhabited a grey zone between legality and criminality, con-
formity and dissidence, Lucjan represents a polarised world, in which
one either wins or loses everything. As a man who works alone and is
accountable only to himself, rather than to any organisation, he also
represents the ideal of an ‘entrepreneurial individual’, promoted in 
the official rhetoric after the collapse of communism in Poland. His 
individualistic attitude is contrasted with that of the other lawyers 
working in Wałbrzych, who act as a corporation, representing a unit-
ed front and curbing any individualistic excesses on the part of any 
of them. Falk compares their modus operandi with that of the late
socialism of the 1970s, when those seeking power formed ‘cliques’
and, consequently, corruption and nepotism reigned in Poland. Thus,
in Falk’s conceptualisation, what was worst in Polish history returns
because postcommunist elites are partly made up of the old nomen-
klatura.[15] What matters, however, is that both the individualistic
entrepreneurs and corporatist post-nomenklatura advance at the
expense of the poor. 
Moved by the plight of the child of his ex-girlfriend whom he
deprives of an accordion, Lucjan tries to undo his actions by helping
financially those to whom he has caused misery. For this purpose he
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uses money with which one of his rich customers, a dishonest busi-
nessman, attempted to bribe him, dividing it between his victims. Yet,
nobody wants Lucjan’s money; poor people avoid him as much in his
new Robin Hood role as they avoided him in his guise as a ‘punishing
angel’. This refusal can be seen as proof of the honesty and dignity of
working class Poles, perhaps in part motivated by Christian values, in
particular, an unwillingness to enrich oneself by means of ‘dirty
money’. Yet, the working class Poles, as shown by Falk, cannot move
beyond this negative act and help themselves. They are shown as com-
pletely passive and mute recipients of the decisions of those standing
above them: the capitalists, politicians and judiciary, who form one
‘postcommunist complex’. In their helplessness and exclusion from
polity they epitomise the idea of Agamben’s ‘bare life’. 
Lucjan’s attempt at a charitable redistribution of his earnings
leads him to jail. He is freed thanks to the efforts of local lawyers, who
help him in the expectation that from now on he will conform to their
ways – become ‘corporatist’. Yet, the last episode, in which Lucjan
angrily disrupts Robert’s funeral, suggests that he rejects the model
they offer. It is impossible to predict which path Lucjan will ultimate-
ly choose, as the film finishes there – in a gesture of refusal. By exten-
sion, Falk’s film offers no positive vision for postcommunist Poland.
Instead, it rejects as unworkable and/or immoral three different polit-
ical-economic systems: the individualistic, ‘modern’ capitalism, repre-
sented by Bohme at the beginning of the film, the ‘new socialism’,
encapsulated by the contrived and reformed bailiff and the new, cor-
poratist capitalism, represented by the members of the Wałbrzych
establishment which Falk regards as a continuation of the old ‘real
socialism’. Ultimately, the film offers no solution to the malaise caused
by neoliberalism. In Falk’s film, everybody is guilty and, therefore,
nobody is really guilty; thus, the status quo is barely challenged. 
Ode to Joy is based on the same premise as Bailiff, namely that
there is little chance for the Polish working class to survive in post-
communist Poland. However, it points to emigration as a way to alle-
viate this harsh condition, facilitated by Poland joining the Euro-
pean Union in 2004. Silesia refers to this phenomenon, asking what
prompts young people to emigrate. The film is set in Bytom, where in
communist times, not unlike in Wałbrzych, as previously discussed,
the working classes enjoyed an above-average standard of living.
Bytom even acted as a magnet for young men from other provinces
who sought employment there in the coalmines, and later proved 
a stronghold for the Solidarity movement because workers’ organisa-
tions were most powerful in large industrial workplaces. Due to its
previous prosperity and heroic past, the economic crisis it suffered
after 1989 appears especially acute. 
In the first scene of the film the main character, Aga, hears on
the radio that there are strikes in several Silesian coalmines. This
Silesia: Working class
people as agents 
of their own downfall
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depressing information reaches her in London, during a bus journey
to her hometown. The radio also mentions the Polish victims of the
London underground bombing of 7 July 2005. We can thus deduce
that for Aga there is no good place to live. In England, she is con-
demned to a lack of personal security, and in Poland to the harsh real-
ity of factories closing down and the political conflict to which such
closures lead. In subsequent parts, the film underscores this message
by visually connecting London with Bytom, showing in both cities
vast areas covered by apartment blocks, which come across as soulless
machines for living. By pointing to the propinquity of London and
Bytom, Kazejak-Dawid also connects the end of communism with the
current state of the First World. As Charity Scribner notes, “The [com-
munist] system’s collapse prompted comparisons to the exhausted
welfare states of the West, particularly in Britain and France”.[16] This
relationship provides a framework for her story, concerning the
difficulties of the working class and young people to find a place for
themselves. However, in the way the director appropriates guilt she
shows that she is not hostile to the neoliberal project, which many crit-
ics hold responsible for the deindustrialisation of entire regions, both
in the East and in the West.   
Following a year of hard work in London, and the realisation
that in England she would always be condemned to menial work, Aga
is determined to find a place in her hometown. She wants to reestab-
lish herself in the apartment of her parents, but this proves difficult, as
her belongings were packed away when Aga’s father, a miner, decided
to renovate their apartment. Yet, he failed to do so, being preoccupied
with organising a Solidarity strike in his mine, threatened with clo-
sure. At the same time, Aga’s mother has lost her job in a hairdressing
salon and now only works occasionally from home, providing hair
care to her neighbours. Her husband’s political involvement and her
own loss of social status have led the mother to a mental breakdown.
Concerned for her mother, Aga decides to invest her savings in a hair-
dresser’s salon with up-to-date tanning facilities, where she can also
work. She thus decides to become a small-scale capitalist, and the film
suggests that her ‘Calvinist’ trajectory’ from hard-working manual
labourer to capitalist would have been successful if not for the workers
themselves, who prevent the more resourceful from improving their
lot. This is demonstrated in a scene depicting a Solidarity demonstra-
tion against the mine’s closure, which changes into hooligan attacks on
local businesses, including the hairdressing salon which they were
about to open. Aga and her mother thus become reduced to bare life,
conveyed not only by their lack of material possessions, but their loss
of language, the inability to talk about their loss other than by using 
a couple of words. 
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Aga’s father, who is one of the leaders of the strike, feels little
remorse for causing such mayhem. When confronted by Aga, he tells
her that organising the demonstration was the right thing to do
because it led to reversing the decision to close the mine and showed
that Solidarity still mattered. For him, the destruction of small busi-
nesses was merely a hiccup in a successful action. Yet, Kazejak-Dawid
makes us identify with the perspective of Aga, who, of course, dis-
agrees – for her, the Solidarity victory equates with the loss of her
livelihood and the necessity to return to London. Solidarity is thus
portrayed in Silesia as a force of conservatism. Its reactionary charac-
ter is underscored by the fact that the strikers are obsessively attached
to symbols. Aga’s father is very offended when she sits on the Solidarity
banner, which provides a poignant contrast to his indifference to the
news about the vandalism of the hairdressing salon. 
Kazejak-Dawid’s criticism of Solidarity is made largely from 
a gender perspective. She does not miss the opportunity to show that
the custodians of working-class traditions are all male and middle-
aged, for whom the ambitions and plans of their wives and daughters
are of little importance. The people who destroy Aga’s business are also
male, although younger. Such a situation encourages one to look back
to the times of the ‘first Solidarity’, led by Lech Wałęsa. During this
period, which finished with the victory of the Solidarity camp in the
1989 and 1990 elections, there appeared voices articulating the need to
cater for the specific interests of female workers and special categories
of employees. Yet, these voices were suppressed in order, as it was pre-
sented at the time, to prevent the fragmentation of the workers’ move-
ment. The assumption was that after the victory of Solidarity, these
‘minor voices’ would be heard and their needs addressed. This hope,
however, was never fulfilled: subsequent governments, many of them
dominated by Solidarity activists, proved anti-female and prejudiced
against certain categories of workers.[17] Kazejak-Dawid’s film thus
suggests that accepting unity in the 1980s led to disunity in the 2000s,
and further discourages such unity along the lines of gender politics.
This does not mean that identity politics has to oppose (pro-worker)
class politics; but the challenge is to make them work for each other;
an idea conveyed by Harvey,[18] as well as by authors such as Hardt
and Negri (2006).[19] For that, however, both similarity and difference
between different types of interests should be acknowledged and
respected, which poignantly does not happen in either Polish political
reality or in Kazejak-Dawid’s film. 
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The eponymous character in Piotr Trzaskalski’s film is a home-
less scrap collector living in Łódź, a city which before the fall of com-
munism was the main centre of the Polish textile industry (known as
the Polish Manchester), as well as a symbol of the Polish capitalist past.
After 1989, Łódź followed the same path as British industrial centres
under Thatcher – deindustrialisation, leading to high unemployment
and poverty. Edi’s situation is harsh, therefore the film can be regard-
ed as an indictment of the capitalism which caused it. Yet, capitalism
is presented in a more ambiguous way. Rather than showing clearly
Harvey’s accumulation by dispossession, Trzaskalski suggests that
capitalist wealth trickles down and is beneficial for Edi, as the ‘crumbs
from rich people’s table’ allow him to survive. Edi and his companion
Jureczek virtually live on what consumer society discards. The more
affluent people buy and throw away, the more the dispossessed sal-
vage. As Edi tells Jureczek, “There is no point looking for scrap on the
estates where poor people live. We should go to the places where the
affluent classes dwell.” 
Edi survives spiritually thanks to a large collection of books,
most likely also discarded by the nouveau riche. His knowledge 
and good character, however, lead to his further deprivation, when 
a local gangster asks him to tutor his sister for a final college exam. 
In due course, the young woman accuses her teacher of raping and
impregnating her. Her brother and fellow gangsters punish Edi by
castrating him and forcing him to look after the young woman’s 
baby son. Soon the gangsters reach him again, upon learning that 
the baby’s mother lied, and take away the child, leaving Edi with 
neither the child nor the physical ability to conceive one. The grad-
ual dispossession of Edi of everything he has and the ruthless, crimi-
nal behaviour of his masters can be viewed as a metaphor for the
‘mafia capitalism’ ruling the postcommunist world, which reduces
those at the receiving end to ‘bare life’. Yet, it is this particular type 
of capitalism, which can be viewed as a fringe or a stage towards 
a ‘civilised capitalism’, which is condemned in Edi, not the neoliberal
order at large. 
Edi does not rebel against his condition of being reduced to 
a mutilated body, but like a true saint accepts his lot, telling Jureczek
that he still has his life and he can do anything he wants with it. On sev-
eral occasions, Edi also preaches to his homeless friend that in a fun-
damental sense all lives are equal because every person is unique: each
has his/her dignity. There is no point being envious of the success of
others or trying to change the world. Hence, as far as Edi is concerned,
the capitalists should be allowed to go on amassing their wealth by dis-
possessing the poor because in a fundamental sense such behaviour
does not affect either those at the top or the bottom of the pile: they
will always remain who they are. Edi’s pronouncements about the fun-
damental uniqueness of every human life and its dignity brings to
mind the concept of the ‘politics of recognition’, as discussed by the
Edi: Everybody’s 
life is equal
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philosopher Charles Taylor.[20] Yet, while Taylor points out that these
ideas led to the development of the concept of ‘human rights’ (such as
the right to live in peace and free education), which have to be pro-
tected by the state so that everybody’s dignity is ensured, Trzaskalski’s
Edi suggests a different line of reasoning – there is no need to protect
human rights by, most importantly, curbing the power of capital or
even ‘mafia capitalists’ because human dignity cannot be destroyed by
either external or internal circumstances. Moreover, Edi himself,
although he is not interested in taking part in the ‘capitalist game’, ulti-
mately accepts its rules and its values. A testimony to this is his deci-
sion to sell his collection of books and use the money to buy a large
shiny car toy for a poor boy. In this way, he not only confirms that con-
sumerist paradise is better than any spiritual heaven, but also shows
his willingness to inculcate this view in the new generation of Poles
and thus help to perpetuate the ‘neoliberal circle’. 
I have argued that the ideological goal of the three films dis-
cussed in this article is showing humanistic concern for those who lost
out in the race for prosperity after Poland took a neoliberal turn, while
accepting or at least not objecting to the overall neoliberal framework
in which they operate. In this way, they repeat the gesture of the
Cinema of Moral Concern, which was critical about the political and
social life of late real socialism, but fell short of advocating the over-
throw of the system, and hence could be seen as normalising the sta-
tus quo by offering its ‘constructive criticism.’[21] Possible reasons for
this stance include: an embracing of Christian values, which include
respect for private property and the requirement to endure one’s suf-
fering as a means of ensuring a reward in heaven, most clearly con-
veyed in Edi; hostility to Solidarity as a hotbed of patriarchy, strongly
conveyed in Silesia; an anti-working class bias, characteristic to many
Polish film waves and especially the Cinema of Moral Concern. One
can also link the ideology of these films to the relatively privileged
position of Polish filmmakers, ensured by state subsidies for film pro-
duction (proportionally higher than in other Eastern European coun-
tries), which they have not wanted to jeopardise by ‘biting the hand
which feeds them’, and thus, by being too critical of the world in which
they operate. 
Conclusions
